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CHASING PERFECTION: COLLATERAL 
INDICATIONS AND AMBIGUOUS DEBTOR 
NAMES ON FINANCING STATEMENTS 
UNDER ARTICLE 9 
Abstract: Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code sought to create consistent 
commercial laws governing secured transactions across the United States. One of 
its principal tenets is that secured lenders must provide notice to other lenders of 
their stake in a debtor’s personal property or fixtures. Secured lenders do so by 
filing a financing statement, a form that third parties can access to see who has a 
security interest in what. Two important aspects of the financing statement are 
the collateral indication and the debtor name. This Note will explore the nuances 
of the collateral indication and debtor name in light of In re Financial Oversight 
and Management Board for Puerto Rico and In re I80 Equipment, LLC, cases 
arising out of the First and Seventh Circuits, respectively. This Note argues that 
Article 9’s collateral indication requirements on the financing statement must not 
be construed to require third parties to search outside a secured lender’s filings to 
determine what collateral may be subject to a security interest. Requiring would-
be creditors to do so is against the express purposes of the Uniform Commercial 
Code and creates uncertainty and an unnecessary burden for such creditors when 
conducting their diligence. This Note further argues that the First Circuit was 
wrong in its determination that the financing statement did refer to the debtor in 
question because when a novel issue arises under Article 9, an interpretation that 
promotes one or more of the Code’s stated purposes should be preferred. 
INTRODUCTION 
The United States’ credit market is the largest in the world and permeates 
throughout the economy and countless markets.1 Credit allows individuals to 
purchase homes, businesses to conduct operations and pay employees, and 
governments to finance its functions.2 Given the prevalence of credit and its 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Kevin McPartland, Understanding the $41 Trillion U.S. Bond Market, FORBES (Oct. 11, 
2018), http://www.forbes.com/sites/kevinmcpartland/2018/10/11/understanding-us-bond-market/#9d6
b2a17caf81 [https://perma.cc/9CGV-MAEL] (detailing the size of the credit market and presence in 
everyday transactions). In the United States, the bond market is valued at $41 trillion and approxi-
mately $500 billion in bonds are exchanged every day. Id. As of October 1, 2019, the U.S. National 
Debt exceeded over $23.6 trillion. US DEBT CLOCK.ORG, http://www.usdebtclock.org [https://perma.
cc/3RTQ-HRBN]. 
 2 See RAYMOND T. NIMMER ET AL., COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS: SECURED FINANCING: CAS-
ES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 9 (3d ed. 2003) (describing various uses credit has in the United States). 
Credit also enables people, businesses, and government entities to borrow funds, write checks, and 
make daily purchases. Id. at 7. 
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enormous impact on the economy at all levels, legal scholars recognized the 
importance of having uniform laws to govern credit transactions secured by 
interests in personal property and fixtures.3 This recognition prompted the cre-
ation of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC or Code), which 
governs most of such transactions.4 The simplest example of a secured transac-
tion occurs between one lender and one debtor: the lender gives the debtor a 
loan and, in return, the debtor grants the lender a security interest in its proper-
ty.5 If the debtor fails to comply with the terms of the loan and defaults, the 
creditor may repossess, sell, or otherwise dispose of tangible collateral, or if 
the agreement so permits, accelerate the debt.6 The agreement between the 
lender and debtor is a security agreement, and the lender attains the status of a 
                                                                                                                           
 3 See William A. Schnader, A Short History of the Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 1 (1967) (discussing the proposal of uniform state com-
mercial laws by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1940). “Per-
sonal property” is defined as “[a]ny movable or intangible thing that is subject to ownership and not 
classified as real property.” Property, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). The Uniform 
Commercial Code (UCC or Code) defines “fixtures” as “goods that have become so related to particu-
lar real property that an interest in them arises under real property law.” U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(41) (AM. 
LAW. INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2018). 
 4 U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (defining the general scope of Article 9). Article 9 does not govern transac-
tions secured by real estate. Id. § 9-109(d)(11). Although there are many similarities between these 
transactions and transactions secured by personal property and fixtures, the drafters of Article 9 rec-
ognized that separate bodies of law already existed for real estate financing and doubted that states 
would change their existing laws. See NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 9. Other transactions that Arti-
cle 9 does not apply to are listed in section 9-109. See generally U.C.C. § 9-109(d). 
 5 See JAMES J. WHITE ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS 2 (2d ed. 2018) (provid-
ing an example of a basic secured transaction). The Code defines “security interest” as “an interest in 
personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.” U.C.C. § 1-
201(b)(35). 
 6 See U.C.C. §§ 9-609 to -610 (stating the secured party’s right to take possession of collateral 
after a default and its right to dispose of collateral after default). The word “default” is not defined in 
Article 9 and is left to the parties involved in the transaction to define the term. WHITE ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 232. Some common occurrences that parties include in their definition of the term “default” 
that may trigger the default are the debtor’s nonpayment, the debtor experiencing bankruptcy, an as-
signment for benefit of creditors, or another event that signals financial difficulties. Id. Default can 
also be triggered when the collateral is goods due to the loss, damage to or destruction of the goods, or 
the debtor’s failure to insure the goods or maintain insurance on the goods. Id. 
 An acceleration clause is a creature of contract, not an Article 9 remedy, and makes a debtor’s 
payments immediately due and payable. Id. at 235. Acceleration clauses are not designed to punish 
debtors, but are included in security agreements for creditors to avoid costly series of litigation. Id. In 
the example of an installment loan, if there were no acceleration clause, the creditor would have to 
wait for the debtor’s default on each separate installment to sue for the payment of that installment, 
whereas a creditor with an acceleration clause could sue for the payment of all installments after the 
debtor defaults on one installment payment. Id. One example of an acceleration clause is an “insecuri-
ty clause.” Id. When an insecurity clause is included in a security agreement, “the creditor may accel-
erate the maturity of the entire debt whenever the credit ‘deems itself insecure.’” Id. The creditor may 
typically invoke an insecurity clause when it wants to avoid possible harmful actions by the debtor 
when the creditor has a genuine belief that the debtor may default. Id. Courts have typically upheld the 
validity of insecurity clauses even though “trigger-happy” creditors can sometimes take advantage of 
them. Id. 
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secured party upon the completion of the security agreement and other re-
quirements.7 When a secured party seeks to create a security interest that is 
enforceable against its debtor and effective against third parties, the secured 
party must comply with the requirements of Article 9.8 
For a secured party to make its security interest effective against other cred-
itors, Article 9 requires that the secured party perfect its security interest.9 The 
notice-filing function of perfection ensures that other potential secured parties 
have the opportunity to discover an existing lien on a debtor’s property before 
they distribute loans.10 Perfection is most commonly achieved through the filing 
of a financing statement with the relevant state office.11 Certain information is 
required on the financing statement, such as an indication of the collateral that is 
subject to the security interest and the name of the debtor.12 If the collateral indi-
cation is insufficient, the name of the debtor is incorrect, or if there are other se-
riously misleading errors, the financing statement is insufficient and, in certain 
circumstances, the security interest cannot be enforced against third parties.13 
                                                                                                                           
 7 See U.C.C. § 9-203(b) (listing the requirements that must be fulfilled for a lender to become a 
secured party); infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (further explaining the requirements for 
creating an enforceable security interest). Not all lenders are secured parties as many choose not to 
take security interests; these lenders are unsecured creditors. NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 11. Due 
to the absence of a security device, an unsecured creditor can often charge a higher interest rate than a 
secured party would in the same transaction because of the higher risk. See id. (describing characteris-
tics of an unsecured creditor). The unsecured creditor also has different legal rights than the secured 
party in the event of a default by the debtor and is a residual claimant when a debtor’s claims are be-
ing paid off in bankruptcy. Id. 
 8 See NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 9 (noting that Article 9 governs secured transactions). 
When a security interest is effective against the debtor, the secured party has the right to repossess if 
the debtor defaults. See WHITE ET AL., supra note 5, at 239 (describing a typical secured party’s rights 
upon a debtor default). Nonetheless, the secured party can choose not to repossess and choose other 
methods of obtaining payment if prescribed in the security agreement. Id. A security interest is en-
forceable against a third party, such as another creditor, if the original creditor can enforce its security 
interest against the debtor before the latter creditor. U.C.C. § 9-201(a). 
 9 See infra notes 57–64 and accompanying text (detailing the policies behind and methods for 
perfecting a security interest). 
 10 See NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 115 (explaining why secured parties must notify other 
creditors). 
 11 See WHITE ET AL., supra note 5, at 60 (noting that the financing statement is generally filed 
with the secretary of state office at the state capital). 
 12 U.C.C. § 9-502(a); see WHITE ET AL., supra note 5, at 87 (detailing the basic requirements of a 
financing statement). 
 13 U.C.C. § 9-502(a). A secured party being unable to enforce its security interest against third 
parties is typically only an issue when the debtor defaults on its loans, declares bankruptcy, or both. 
See WHITE ET AL., supra note 5, at 49 (describing the effect of perfection on a secured party). Sup-
pose Debtor X grants Creditor A a security interest in its tractor and Creditor A extends Debtor X a 
loan for $50,000, the value of the tractor. See U.C.C. § 9-502(a) (providing the rule for filing a suffi-
cient financing statement). Creditor A subsequently files an insufficient financing statement. Debtor X 
then grants Creditor B a security interest in the same tractor and Creditor B extends a loan for 
$50,000. Creditor B subsequently files a sufficient financing statement. Assuming Debtor X made no 
payments on either of its loans, when Debtor X defaults, Creditor A cannot enforce its security interest 
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Secured parties can indicate collateral on financing statements in multiple 
ways.14 One way is through a cross-reference to the description of the collat-
eral in the security agreement, so long as the security agreement is attached.15 
The precise boundaries of this method became the subject of recent litigation: 
the First Circuit, in In re Financial Oversight and Management Board for 
Puerto Rico (In re Financial Oversight), tackled a unique set of facts that pre-
sented two novel issues to the secured transactions universe.16 There, the fi-
nancing statement cross-referenced an attached security agreement to indicate 
the collateral.17 This practice would normally pose no issue, but instead of de-
fining the collateral itself, the security agreement referenced an unattached, but 
publicly available, document for the definition of the collateral.18 A similar 
issue also arose a few months later in In re I80 Equipment, LLC.19 In this case, 
the financing statement referred to the collateral described in the security 
                                                                                                                           
against Creditor B because of the insufficient financing statement. See id. Therefore, Creditor B can 
take the tractor to satisfy its loan obligation and Creditor A is left with no collateral to satisfy its loan. 
See id. 
 Despite an insufficient financing statement, a security interest may nonetheless be enforceable 
against a third party if the security interest is perfected by an alternative method, such as by posses-
sion, control, or automatic perfection. Id. § 9-310(b). In addition, an unperfected security interest is 
enforceable against a buyer of collateral if the buyer has knowledge of the security interest. Id. § 9-
317(b). 
 14 See infra notes 76–79 and accompanying text (outlining the available options for lenders to 
indicate the collateral on a financing statement). 
 15 See, e.g., Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Hobbs Equip. Co., 894 F.2d 1287, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(determining that referencing a lease agreement attached to a financing statement for the description 
of the collateral met the requirements for indicating the collateral); In re Tebbs Constr. Co., 39 B.R. 
742, 747–48 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (holding that the financing statement was sufficient because it 
properly incorporated the security agreement and met Article 9’s notice requirement); Hixon v. Credit 
All. Corp., 369 S.E.2d 169, 171–72 (Va. 1988) (concluding that the lender perfected its security inter-
est because the security agreement described the collateral by type and was attached as a schedule to 
the financing statement). The security agreement may or may not have the terms of the loan included 
in the agreement, and the absence of these terms does not negate the status of the agreement as the 
security agreement; it will always grant the lender a security interest in the debtor’s collateral de-
scribed in the agreement. See WHITE ET AL., supra note 5, at 55 (detailing the relationship between the 
security agreement and the loan). When a debtor takes multiple loans from a creditor and the creditor 
has interests in various debtor assets, well-written security agreements will make clear which collat-
eral secures which loan. Id. 
 16 See Altair Glob. Credit Opportunities Fund (A), LLC v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. 
(In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.) (In re Financial Oversight), 914 F.3d 694, 703 (1st Cir. 
2019) (attesting to the unique circumstances of the case); see also infra notes 108–134 (laying out the 
facts of In re Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico). 
 17 Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Altair Glob. Credit Opportunities Fund (A), LLC (In re 
Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.) (In re Financial Oversight (P.R.)), 590 B.R. 577, 585 (D.P.R. 
2018) (detailing the information provided on the initial financing statement). 
 18 See id. (explaining that the security agreement did not include a copy of the publicly available 
document that defined in detail the collateral, titled the Pension Funding Bond Resolution). 
 19 See First Midwest Bank v. Reinbold (In re I80 Equip., LLC), 938 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2019) 
(stating that the court must decide whether incorporation by reference is a sufficient way to indicate 
the collateral). 
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agreement, but did not attach the security agreement to the filing or make the 
security agreement available.20 The facts in both of these cases raise an Article 
9 interpretive question; specifically, whether the secured parties satisfied the 
notice-filing principle of Article 9.21 Further, the cases have significant conse-
quences for secured parties’ rights in bankruptcy.22 
The other issue in In re Financial Oversight was a potential ambiguity in 
the debtor’s name.23 The Puerto Rican legislature allegedly changed the debtor-
government entity’s name by amending the original law that created the entity, 
and this amendment, likely by mistake, designated a new name for the entity in 
various parts of the English version of the statute.24 In the act and in the updated 
statute, however, the legislature referred to the entity by its original name, creat-
ing a question as to what the actual name of the entity was.25 These facts raise 
more interpretive issues: what the name of a governmental entity is and how 
strictly or liberally courts should construe statutes that create a government enti-
ty and designate its name.26 
Part I of this Note details the historical background of the UCC and Arti-
cle 9, how secured lenders create a security interest that is enforceable against 
the debtor and third parties, the filing system, and the financing statement.27 
Part II of this Note examines the facts of In re Financial Oversight and In re 
                                                                                                                           
 20 Id. at 869. The financing statement read “[a]ll Collateral described in First Amended and Re-
stated Security Agreement dated March 9, 2015 between Debtor and Secured Party.” Id. 
 21 See In re I80 Equip., LLC, 938 F.3d at 869; In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 588 
(describing the UCC’s public notice function). The notice-filing principle is satisfied if the financing 
statement “indicates merely that a person may have a security interest in the collateral indicated.” 
U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 2. “Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to disclose the 
complete state of affairs.” Id. 
 22 See NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 116 (stating that the notice system should allow for parties 
to adequately assess risk from a planning perspective). 
 23 See In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 706–07 (reiterating the facts regarding the name of 
the debtor); In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 585 (posing that the name of the debtor may 
have changed after the Puerto Rican legislature passed an act that, after translated into English, 
amended the original statute that created the debtor); see also infra notes 121–124 (detailing the 
amendments to the law that created the retirement system). 
 24 1951 P.R. LAWS 1298, amended by 2013 P.R. LAWS 39 (codified as amended at P.R. LAWS 
ANN. tit. 3, § 761 (2011)); see In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 585 (discussing the 
amendment to the original act). In 1951, the Puerto Rican legislature established the “Employees 
Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico” (ERS). In re Financial 
Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 582–83. In 2013, the legislature adopted 2013 P.R. LAWS 39, which 
amended the original 1951 law. Id. at 585. Section 1-101 of 2013 P.R. LAWS 39 stated that the name 
of the government entity to be designated as the “Retirement System for Employees of the Govern-
ment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.” Id. Although the first section of the amended statute 
used a new name to designate the retirement system, the old name persisted throughout the rest of the 
statute. Id. 
 25 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, §§ 761–788; 2013 P.R. LAWS 39. 
 26 See In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 703 (noting the unique circumstances that led to the 
ambiguity in the debtor’s name). 
 27 See infra notes 32–99 and accompanying text. 
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I80 Equipment, LLC.28 Part III of this Note argues that third parties should not 
be required to search outside of a secured lender’s filings to determine what 
collateral may be subject to a security interest.29 Part III of this Note also ar-
gues that the clause in the statute that designates the name of a government 
entity should always be the name of a government entity for UCC purposes.30 
Lastly, Part III of this Note argues that when a novel issue arises under Article 
9, an interpretation that promotes one or more of the Code’s stated purposes 
should be preferred.31 
I. THE UCC AND ARTICLE 9’S FRAMEWORK AND LAWS  
GOVERNING FINANCING STATEMENTS 
The UCC represents a monumental innovation in American law.32 Its 
prominence is in part due to the fact that it is a uniform law that every state in 
the United States has adopted.33 Article 9 of the Code governs secured transac-
tions, which arise when personal property or fixtures are offered as collateral 
in a lending arrangement.34 Article 9 gives secured parties various responsibili-
ties that they must fulfill to make their security interest effective against third 
parties, one of those being the filing of a financing statement.35 This require-
ment was at issue in In re Financial Oversight and In re I80 Equipment, LLC.36 
This Part details the history of the Code and Article 9, the methods to cre-
ate and enforce a proper security interest, background information on filing 
and the financing statement, the rules governing the sufficiency of a collateral 
description on a financing statement, and the rules for providing a debtor’s 
                                                                                                                           
 28 See infra notes 100–186 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 194–211 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 212–227 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 228–244 and accompanying text. 
 32 See Fred H. Miller, The Uniform Commercial Code: Will the Experiment Continue?, 43 MER-
CER L. REV. 799, 808 (quoting JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE 5 (3d ed. 1988)) (stating that the UCC is among the greatest successes in American law). 
 33 See id. (describing the extraordinariness of the Code because all fifty states have adopted a majori-
ty of the Code). The UCC has nine separate articles as of the 2018 edition. See generally U.C.C. Louisi-
ana is the only state to not adopt the entire Code, having omitted Article 2 (Sales). States Adopting the 
UCC, Louisiana, USLEGAL, https://uniformcommercialcode.uslegal.com/states-adopting-the-ucc/
louisiana/ [https://perma.cc/BT2C-P6VT]. 
 34 See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Commodifying Consumer Data in the Era of the Internet of Things, 59 
B.C. L. REV. 423, 457 (2018) (stating that a state’s Article 9 governs a secured lending transaction 
between creditors and debtors). 
 35 U.C.C. § 9-310. There are some exceptions that do not require the filing of a financing state-
ment. Id.; see infra notes 63–64 and accompanying text (describing the other methods for ensuring a 
security interest is effective against third parties). 
 36 See In re I80 Equip., LLC, 938 F.3d at 874 (finding that the collateral indication was sufficient 
to perfect); In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 721 (holding that bondholders’ security interest 
failed to perfect due to an insufficient collateral indication, but the financing statement amendments 
did provide the debtor name). 
2020] Collateral Indications & Ambiguous Debtor Names on Financing Statements 2235 
name on a financing statement.37 Section A explains the history and drafting of 
the Code, Article 9, and the amendments thereto.38 Section B discusses rele-
vant principles of commercial law and the functions that the law of perfection 
serves.39 Section C describes the filing process and the information required to 
submit a sufficient financing statement.40 Section D sets out the framework for 
sufficiently indicating the collateral on a financing statement.41 Section E de-
scribes the Code’s rules with respect to providing the debtor’s name on a fi-
nancing statement.42 
A. Brief History of the Uniform Commercial Code and Article 9 
On January 1, 1945, a group led by Karl Llewellyn began constructing the 
first draft of the UCC; by September of 1951 their work was finished.43 Their 
proposal was, and still is, a model code that would align state laws to facilitate 
commercial transactions.44 Pennsylvania became the first state to adopt the 
UCC in 1953, and after Massachusetts adopted a revised version of the Code 
in 1957, other states followed.45 Despite a long and arduous legislative path to 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See infra notes 43–99 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 43–52 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 53–64 and accompanying text. 
 40 See infra notes 65–74 and accompanying text. 
 41 See infra notes 75–86 and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 87–99 and accompanying text. 
 43 See Schnader, supra note 3, at 5 (reviewing the history leading up to the formation of the UCC 
and the forces that put it into place). At the time, Karl Llewellyn was a professor at Columbia Univer-
sity Law School and one of the foremost experts on commercial law. Id. at 4. A notable legal realist, it 
was among his and other drafters’ intentions to import the idea of commercial reasonableness into the 
UCC so that state legislatures would incorporate the UCC into their own state laws. See Grant Gil-
more, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 815 (1962) (stating that for Llewellyn, it was 
necessary that the Code be passed by all state legislatures); Imad D. Abyad, Note, Commercial Rea-
sonableness in Karl Llewellyn’s Uniform Commercial Code Jurisprudence, 83 VA. L. REV. 429, 429 
(1997) (describing Llewellyn’s vision behind the Code). 
 44 See NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 2 (reviewing the purpose behind the creation of the UCC). 
The UCC proposed by the drafters, Llewellyn, and others is the “Official Text.” Id. Section 1-103(a) 
of the Code lists the purposes of the UCC, including “to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law gov-
erning commercial transactions.” U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1). 
 45 See Schnader, supra note 3, at 8–9 (specifying which states were the early adopters of the 
Code). Revisions to the initial version of the UCC were required after the actions of the New York 
Legislature. Id. The Legislature sent the UCC along to the New York Law Revision Commission to 
study it and develop a report on it. Id. at 8. The Commission found that having uniform commercial 
laws was a good idea, but proposed various changes in its 1956 report. See Robert Braucher, The 1956 
Revision of the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 VILL. L. REV. 3, 4 (1956) (outlining the details of the 
1956 Report of the New York Law Revision Commission); Schnader, supra note 3, at 8–9 (detailing 
the New York Law Revision Commission’s recommendations to improve the UCC). This prompted 
the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code to consider the proposed changes and it created 
a revised version of the UCC in the fall of 1956. Schnader, supra note 3, at 9. By 1963, the UCC was 
enacted in twenty-seven states, including the most important commercial states: New York, Califor-
nia, the District of Columbia, and Pennsylvania, which had adopted the recently revised version of the 
UCC. Id. By 1968, the UCC was enacted and effective in all states except Louisiana. Id. at 10. 
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enactment, the UCC successfully created uniform commercial processes and 
simplified commercial transactions across the United States.46 
Article 9 of the Code governs “Secured Transactions.”47 Prior to the enact-
ment of the UCC, each state had its own laws that governed secured transac-
tions, which created headaches for transactional attorneys.48 Introduced in 1962, 
Article 9 was quickly put into effect in all states because it addressed the prob-
lems posed by states’ varying laws.49 Its key innovations were the usage of con-
sistent terminology and the grouping of common security devices into one code 
of laws.50 As such, states found it in their best interests to incorporate the UCC 
into their laws to make business transactions across state borders seamless.51 
Since its inception, Article 9 has undergone various revisions, most notably with 
the 1998 revisions that led to Revised Article 9 and most recently with the 2010 
amendments that went into effect in most states on July 1, 2013.52 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Lawrence J. Bugge, Commercial Law, Federalism, and the Future, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 11, 
25 (1992) (noting the successes of the UCC and the impression it has left on lawyers); Miller, supra 
note 32, at 808 (describing the Code’s prominence in American law). 
 47 U.C.C. § 9-101. Before the nineteenth century, nonpossessory security interests, where a se-
cured lender had an interest in the collateral but did not have possession of the collateral, were invalid. 
See 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 24–25 (1965) (describing 
historical legal attitudes towards security interests). Considering the high demand for credit in an 
increasingly industrialized nation in the nineteenth century, this rule was abandoned, and nonposses-
sory security interests were permitted. Id. at 25. It is important to note that Article 9 does not govern 
the creation or transfer of an interest in real property, i.e. mortgages, and is limited to interests in per-
sonal property or fixtures. U.C.C. §§ 9-109(a)(1), (d)(11). 
 48 See WHITE ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (describing the wide variety of personal property security 
laws in states prior to the UCC). The disparity in state laws posed a real problem because one type of 
security device may be created by statute in one state, created by common law in another state, and be 
non-existent in yet another state. Id. Further, states had different requirements for the same type of 
security device, which created problems for lawyers attempting to draft loan agreements that affected 
parties in more than one state. Id. 
 49 See id. at 2–3 (noting the major innovations of Article 9 that led to its quick adoption among all 
states). Although the revised UCC in 1956 included Article 9, the last full revision of the UCC occurred 
in 1962 and prompted most states to enact it. See Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Timeline, CORP. 
SERV. CO., https://www.cscglobal.com/service/cls/ucc-timeline [https://perma.cc/54MH-6FHD] 
(providing a detailed timeline of the UCC). After the 1962 UCC revisions, all subsequent revisions 
took place within individual articles. Id. Grant Gilmore, Allison Dunham, and Karl Llewellyn are the 
principal authors of Article 9. WHITE ET AL., supra note 5, at 1–2. Gilmore first formulated his idea 
for the uniform secured transaction laws in 1948. GILMORE, supra note 47, at 290 n.2 (citing Grant 
Gilmore & Allan Axelrod, Chattel Security: 1, 57 YALE L.J. 517, 761 (1948)). At the time of the 
preliminary drafts of Article 9, it was apparent that all three of the principal authors were working on 
initial concepts of Article 9. Id. 
 50 See WHITE ET AL., supra note 5, at 2 (stating the importance of using consistent terms to facili-
tate smooth commercial transactions). Article 9 uses defined terms such as “collateral,” “security 
interest,” and “debtor” to group together common security devices and create the common language 
with which transactional attorneys speak today. Id. at 2–3. 
 51 See NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 3 (noting the enactment of the UCC in all states). 
 52 Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Timeline, supra note 49. The first amendments to Article 9 
were in 1972 after multiple years with the Code in place, but Article 9 eventually grew outdated and 
required additional changes to modernize. Id. As computers began facilitating transactions and states 
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B. Creating an Enforceable and Perfected Security Interest 
Attachment, perfection, and priority are three features of Article 9 that 
must be understood before considering the issues in this Note.53 Attachment 
relates to the creditor’s ability to enforce its security interest against the debt-
or.54 Section 9-203(b) of the UCC provides the requirements for a security in-
terest to be enforceable.55 Upon satisfaction of these requirements, the lender’s 
security interest attaches.56 
Whereas attachment relates to the creation of a security interest against 
the debtor, perfection relates to the effectiveness of a security interest against 
third parties.57 Furthermore, the secured party’s date of perfection can be its 
priority date—i.e., the date that will be used to determine whether the secured 
party’s rights are superior to those of other creditors.58 The concept of perfec-
tion is rooted in the idea of notice; secured parties must give adequate notice to 
third parties that they have a claim to the debtor’s property and Article 9 gov-
erns how this notice must be given.59 The perfection rules serve two functions: 
                                                                                                                           
made amendments to their respective Article 9’s, the law of secured transactions became less uniform. 
NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 2; Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) Timeline, supra note 49. This 
led to the creation of Revised Article 9 in 1998, which took effect in most states on July 1, 2001. Uni-
form Commercial Code (UCC) Timeline, supra note 49. The final amendments in 2010 serve the pur-
pose of clarifying some of the issues that Revised Article 9 presented. Id. Revised Article 9 is current-
ly the law in every state, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 19, §§ 2211–
2409 (2011); NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 3. This Note will refer to “Revised Article 9” as “Arti-
cle 9.” 
 53 U.C.C. §§ 9-203, -308, -317. Within Article 9, section 9-203 lists the requirements for attach-
ment. Id. § 9-203. Sections 9-308 through 9-316 lay out the rules on how to perfect. Id. §§ 9-308 to -
316. Sections 9-317 through 9-339 govern priority. Id. §§ 9-317 to -339. 
 54 Id. § 9-203. Section 9-203(a) states, “A security interest attaches to collateral when it becomes 
enforceable against the debtor with respect to the collateral, unless an agreement expressly postpones 
the time of attachment.” Id. 
 55 Id. § 9-203(b). The first requirement is that “value has been given.” Id. § 9-203(b)(1). This re-
quirement necessitates that at some point, the creditor extends value to the debtor. Id. The second re-
quirement is that “the debtor has rights in the collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral to a 
secured party.” Id. § 9-203(b)(2). Finally, section 9-203(b)(3) requires that at least one of four conditions 
be met. Id. § 9-203(b)(3). The condition most commonly satisfied is section 9-203(b)(3)(A), which re-
quires that “the debtor has authenticated a security agreement that provides a description of the collat-
eral.” Id. § 9-203(b)(3)(A). This requires a record, either written or electronic, of the agreement and 
the debtor’s authentication. Id.; NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 74. 
 56 U.C.C. § 9-203. 
 57 See NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 115 (discussing the role of perfection in a secured transac-
tion). Secured creditors face threats from various types of third parties, such as other secured creditors, 
unsecured creditors, lien creditors, bankruptcy trustees, and U.S. Government with respect to tax liens. 
26 U.S.C. §§ 6321–6323 (2018); see WHITE ET AL., supra note 5, at 60 (describing the parties that 
threaten secured creditors). 
 58 See U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(1) (stating the priority rule as between two secured parties). If Party X 
files or perfects before Party Y files or perfects, Party Y is subordinate to Party X and Party X has 
priority to the collateral over Party Y, subject to some exceptions. See id. 
 59 See NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 116 (describing the hostility towards secret liens). Article 
9’s notice system is designed to protect parties against secret liens—a lien where only the debtor and 
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they permit secured parties to establish certainty of their position in the long 
term and generally allow parties to discover if someone else has already staked 
a claim to a debtor’s property.60 
A security interest perfects when the interest attaches and the applicable re-
quirements for perfection have been met.61 The steps for perfection are codified 
in sections 9-310 through 9-316 and can be satisfied, depending on the type of 
collateral, by control, through possession, automatically, or by filing.62 Although 
the general rule to perfect a security interest is to file a financing statement, there 
are exceptions to this rule.63 Nonetheless, for many types of commercial transac-
tions, a prudent transactional attorney would file a financing statement because it 
is a cheap and practical way to perfect a security interest.64 
                                                                                                                           
secured lender know of the transaction—and the ill will towards secret liens can be traced back to 
1601. See GILMORE, supra note 47, at 24 n.2 (chronicling the history of opposition against secret 
liens). See generally Twyne’s Case (1601) 76 Eng. Rep. 809, 3 Co. Rep. 80 b. In Twyne’s Case, 
Pierce was indebted against Twyne and another creditor, who was suing Pierce. Id. at 810–11. Pierce 
knew he was going to lose the lawsuit, so to shield his assets from seizure, he deeded his goods and 
sheep to Twyne in payment for the debt to Twyne, but Pierce maintained possession of the assets and 
continued to use them. Id. at 811. Because Twyne had the deed to the goods and sheep, when the 
creditor sought to enforce judgment against Pierce, Pierce argued that they were not his assets, rather 
Twyne’s, and therefore could not be seized. Id. The court held this transaction to be fraudulent and 
therefore ineffective with respect to Pierce’s other creditor. Id. at 812. Pierce’s continued possession 
of the goods and sheep rendered the transaction void, and subsequent courts at common law held that 
secured transactions where the creditor did not retain possession of the collateral were invalid. Id. at 
813; see NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 117 (recounting the court’s holding). Due to the costs of 
disallowing non-possessory security interests, such as the high barrier for manufacturers’ access to 
credit, once the concept of filing was established, non-possessory security interests were validated so 
long as the filing met the Code’s requirements. NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 117–18 (citing Doug-
las G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession & Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article 
9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175, 180–81 (1983)); see infra notes 75–99 and accompanying text (detailing the 
Code’s requirements for a valid financing statement filing). 
 60 See NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 115 (stating the importance of Article 9’s perfection rules 
and the functions they serve). 
 61 U.C.C. § 9-203. 
 62 Id. §§ 9-310 to -316; see infra notes 63–64 (describing methods of perfection based on the type 
of collateral). When undergoing a secured transaction, it is important that a secured lender first classi-
fies the collateral it is attempting to take a security interest in. NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 58. 
Personal property, in reality, can be classified as either goods or intangibles, but Article 9 has made 
further specified collateral classification types to make rules based on the type of collateral. Id. 
 63 U.C.C. § 9-310(a). If the collateral is a deposit account or is a letter-of-credit right, the security 
interest in the collateral may be perfected only by control. Id. § 9-312(b)(1)–(2) (a creditor has control 
of a deposit account if it complies with section 9-104 and has a letter-of-credit right if it complies with 
section 9-107). If the collateral is money, the security interest in the collateral may be perfected only 
by possession. Id. § 9-312(b)(3). 
 Further, if section 9-311 applies, the creditor must satisfy the federal or state public notice sys-
tems that supplant Article 9’s notice rules. Id. § 9-311. For example, if a creditor took a security inter-
est in an aircraft, it could not perfect through Article 9, as it would have to follow the rules provided 
by the Federal Aviation Act. See id. § 9-311(a). At the state level, cars and trucks are governed by 
certificate of title statutes that creditors must follow. See id. § 9-311(b). 
 64 Id. § 9-310(a). A security interest can also perfect when it attaches, a concept known as auto-
matic perfection. Id. § 9-309. 
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C. Filing and the Financing Statement 
The lending party files its financing statement in the applicable state of-
fice.65 The Code defines a financing statement as “a record or records com-
posed of an initial financing statement and any filed record relating to the ini-
tial financing statement.”66 The information needed to file an effective initial 
financing statement is set out in sections 9-502 through 9-504.67 Section 9-502 
prescribes that the secured party must provide the name of the debtor, the name 
of the secured party or representative of the secured party, and indicate the col-
lateral covered by the financing statement.68 Section 9-503 lays out the rules 
for providing the name of the debtor.69 Finally, section 9-504 details the infor-
mation needed on a financing statement to sufficiently indicate the collateral.70 
Financing statements are effective for five years after the date of filing.71 
To further the effectiveness of a financing statement and keep a party’s priority 
date, secured parties must file a continuation statement within six months prior 
to the five years expiration date.72 The continuation statement is a type of 
amendment, and by using a Form UCC-3, parties can amend their initial fi-
nancing statements.73 According to section 9-512, parties can file an amend-
ment that, along with continuing the effectiveness of a financing statement, can 
terminate a financing statement, add or delete collateral, and amend other in-
formation in the financing statement.74 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Id. § 9-310(a). The relevant state office is determined by following the Code’s choice of law 
rules prescribed in sections 9-301 through 9-307. Id. §§ 9-301 to -307. 
 66 Id. § 9-102(a)(39). The 2010 Amendments created a uniform initial financing statement form 
titled the “UCC-1.” Id. § 9-521(a). 
 67 Id. §§ 9-502 to -504. 
 68 Id. § 9-502(a). 
 69 Id. § 9-503; see infra notes 87–99 and accompanying text (detailing the requirements for 
providing the name of the debtor). 
 70 U.C.C. § 9-504; see infra notes 75–86 and accompanying text (outlining the Code’s require-
ments for a sufficient collateral indication). 
 71 U.C.C. § 9-515(a). 
 72 Id. § 9-515(c). If a secured party files an initial financing statement on January 1, 2020, the 
continuation statement must be filed between July 1, 2025 and December 31, 2025 for the secured 
party to remain perfected and keep its priority date. See id. If the secured party fails to file a continua-
tion statement in the relevant period, “it is deemed never to have been perfected as against a purchaser 
of the collateral for value.” Id. A “purchaser of the collateral for value” includes buyers and secured 
parties but does not include lien creditors. See WHITE ET AL., supra note 5, at 123 (providing exam-
ples of purchasers of collateral for value). 
 73 U.C.C. § 9-512; see 1 BARKLEY CLARK & BARBARA CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANS-
ACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2.14 (3d ed. 2019) (detailing the filing of a 
continuation statement on the Form UCC-3). The Form UCC-3 can be found in section 9-521(b). 
U.C.C. § 9-521(b). 
 74 U.C.C. § 9-512. 
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D. The Collateral Indication 
A financing statement is insufficient if it does not “indicate[] the collateral 
covered by the financing statement.”75 Section 9-504 lists the two ways to sat-
isfy this requirement.76 One way is to indicate that the financing statement co-
vers “all assets” or “all personal property.”77 The second way is to describe the 
collateral pursuant to section 9-108.78 A description reasonably identifies col-
lateral as required by section 9-108 if a collateral indication identifies the col-
lateral by specific listing, category, a type of UCC collateral such as “ac-
counts” or “equipment,” quantity, computational or allocational formula or 
procedure, or any other way that makes the identity of the collateral objective-
ly determinable.79 The Code rejects the “serial number” test that requires filers 
to be exact and detailed in their descriptions.80 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit 
held that a collateral indication that erroneously described the collateral could 
be corrected by a supergeneric description in the same financing statement.81 
The court justified this holding by relying on the Code’s emphasis on the prin-
ciple of notice filing.82 
Secured lenders are permitted to describe the collateral by referencing the 
security agreement, but filers should include the security agreement as an exhibit 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Id. § 9-502(a)(3). 
 76 Id. § 9-504. 
 77 Id. § 9-504(2). Section 9-504(2) permits supergeneric descriptions and satisfying the require-
ment can be accomplished simply by writing, “All debtor’s assets.” WHITE ET AL., supra note 5, at 53. 
 78 U.C.C. § 9-504(1). 
 79 Id. § 9-108(b). It is not necessary for filers to include an after-acquired property clause in the 
collateral description if the secured lender identifies the collateral by type. Id. § 9-502 cmt. 2. Due to 
Article 9’s permission of supergeneric descriptions in financing statements, it is possible for a descrip-
tion to be sufficient for financing statement purposes but not for security agreement purposes. Id. 
§§ 9-108, -504. A description that is sufficient for security agreement purposes, however, is sufficient 
for financing statement purposes. Id.; WHITE ET AL., supra note 5, at 53. 
 80 U.C.C. § 9-108 cmt. 2; see also Bishop v. All. Banking Co., 412 S.W.3d 217, 280 (Ky. Ct. 
App. 2013) (finding that a filed financing statement that accurately identified the collateralized back-
hoe by make, model, and year but that misstated the first three digits of the serial number was suffi-
cient to perfect); Maxus Leasing Grp., Inc. v. Kobelco Am., Inc., No. 5:04-CV-518 (FJS/DEP), 2007 
WL 655779, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2007) (holding that a financing statement that omitted one digit 
of a crane’s serial number, but otherwise correctly indicated the crane’s year, make, and model, was 
effective to perfect; the error was minor and not seriously misleading). 
 81 See ProGrowth Bank, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 558 F.3d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 2009) (hold-
ing that the creditor’s financing statement perfected its security interest despite an error in the collat-
eral indication). In the lender’s financing statement, the collateral indication included a supergeneric 
clause followed by incorrectly identifying the debtor’s annuity contract. Id. at 811. 
 82 See id. at 814–15 (noting that the statements in the collateral description must be judged in 
their entirety). The notice requirement is met if third parties are on notice that the filer may have a 
security interest in the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 2. After viewing the financing statement, pru-
dent third parties should then inquire further to understand the complete transaction. Id. The Eighth 
Circuit concluded that, despite the errors in indicating the collateral by type in ProGrowth Bank, third 
parties were on notice that all of the debtor’s assets may be subject to a security interest due to the 
inclusion of a supergeneric description. 558 F.3d at 815. 
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to the financing statement to avoid litigation.83 In In re Lynch, the U.S. Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Western District of Wisconsin held that describing the col-
lateral as the security agreement did not perfect the secured lender’s security 
interest, partially due to the fact that the security agreement was not attached as 
an exhibit.84 In In re The Holladay House, Inc., the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for 
the Eastern District of Virginia concluded that, although the security agreement 
was attached as an exhibit to the filing statement, the secured lender failed to 
perfect its security interest because the collateral description never cross-
referenced the security agreement.85 Secured lenders must exercise caution when 
employing this method to describe the collateral, although including the security 
agreement as an exhibit and cross-referencing it appears to be sufficient to per-
fect.86 
E. The Debtor’s Name 
A financing statement is also insufficient if it fails to provide the name of 
the debtor.87 Filing offices index their files alphabetically based on the name of 
the debtor, so it is crucial that secured lenders are precise in providing the 
                                                                                                                           
 83 CLARK & CLARK, supra note 73, § 2.09 (citing In re H.L. Bennett Co., 588 F.2d 389 (3d Cir. 
1978)). 
 84 Rameker v. Farmers State Bank (In re Lynch), 313 B.R. 798, 800 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 2004). 
The debtor and creditor in In re Lynch agreed to a General Business Security Agreement that granted 
the creditor a security interest in various types of collateral. Id. at 799. In the financing statement, the 
creditor described the collateral as “general business security agreement now owned or hereafter ac-
quired.” Id. at 799–800. No documents were attached to the filed financing statement. Id. at 800. Alt-
hough the financing statement indicated the existence of a security agreement between the creditor 
and debtor, the financing statement failed to indicate the actual collateral subject to the creditor’s 
security interest. Id. The court concluded that, because the creditor only provided notice of a security 
interest, third parties were not on notice of which of the debtor’s assets were subject to the security 
interest, and therefore the creditor’s security interest did not perfect. Id. at 801. 
 85 387 B.R. 689, 697 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2008). The debtor and creditor executed a security/consignment 
agreement that granted the creditor a security interest in goods that the creditor delivered on consign-
ment to the debtor as well as all other inventory of the debtor. Id. at 691–92 & 691 n.2. The creditor 
filed a timely financing statement, but the creditor described the collateral as “[a]ll inventory . . . de-
livered to consignee at any time by consignor pursuant to a consignment agreement between the con-
signee and consignor.” Id. at 693. The security/consignment agreement was attached to the financing 
statement, but the financing statement did not reference or incorporate the security/consignment 
agreement. Id. The court reasoned that a reasonable third party relies on the indication of the collateral 
of the financing statement and nothing else. Id. at 696. Consequently, third parties only had notice of 
the security interest in the consigned items delivered by the debtor. Id. at 697. The creditor did not 
perfect its security interest as to the other collateral in the security/consignment agreement. Id. A lead-
ing Article 9 treatise has, however, queried whether this decision is appropriate given the Code’s poli-
cy of notice-filing and the fact that the security agreement and financing statement were filed together. 
CLARK & CLARK, supra note 73, § 2.09. 
 86 See CLARK & CLARK, supra note 73, § 2.09 (noting that it is best practice for secured lenders 
to attach the security agreement and cross-reference it if they choose this method to indicate the col-
lateral for purposes of the financing statement). 
 87 U.C.C. § 9-502(a)(1). 
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debtor’s exact name.88 The Code contains different rules for providing the 
debtor’s name, depending on the debtor’s status.89 
Section 9-503 lays out how to sufficiently provide the name of the debtor.90 
If the debtor is a “registered organization,” a secured lender, to sufficiently pro-
vide the name of the debtor, must use “the name that is stated to be the registered 
organization’s name on the public organic record most recently filed with or is-
sued or enacted by the registered organization’s jurisdiction of organization 
which purports to state, amend, or restate the registered organization’s name.”91 
The Code defines “registered organization” as “an organization formed or orga-
nized solely under the law of a single state or the United States by the filing of a 
public organic record with, the issuance of a public organic record by, or the en-
actment of legislation by the State or the United States.”92 Furthermore, the 
Code is explicit when it comes to trade names, stating that providing the trade 
name alone will render an insufficient financing statement.93 
If a secured lender fails to comply with section 9-503, but a third party is 
able to find the secured lender’s financing statement by searching under the 
debtor’s correct name using the “standard search logic” of the filing office, the 
financing statement is not rendered ineffective because it is not considered “se-
riously misleading.”94 Regardless of this safe-harbor, secured lenders must do 
all they can to ensure they are providing the exact name of the debtor, as some 
states’ filing offices have stringent search parameters.95 
                                                                                                                           
 88 See CLARK & CLARK, supra note 73, § 2.09 (describing how filing offices index). 
 89 See id. (noting that Article 9 has introduced clear rules for lenders to follow regarding provid-
ing the name of the debtor). The Code has rules for providing the debtor name for a registered organi-
zation, decedent’s estate, trust or trustee, general partnership, or individual, and creates a residual rule 
for other types of debtors. U.C.C. § 9-503. This Note will only detail the rules surrounding debtors as 
registered organizations. See infra notes 91–93 and accompanying text (describing the rules for 
providing a debtor’s name when the debtor is a registered organization). 
 90 U.C.C. § 9-503. 
 91 Id. § 9-503(a)(1). 
 92 Id. § 9-102(a)(71). 
 93 Id. § 9-503(c). If a company is named “X, Inc.” it may have a trade name such as “X Compa-
ny” or “X Holdings.” See id. In In re EDM Corp., the creditor provided the actual name of the debtor 
and the trade name of the debtor on the financing statement: “EDM CORPORATION D/B/A EDM 
EQUIPMENT.” Hastings State Bank v. Stalnaker (In re EDM Corp.), 431 B.R. 459, 461 (B.A.P. 8th 
Cir. 2010). The d/b/a, “doing business as,” indicating the debtor’s trade name, was an unnecessary 
inclusion for providing the name of the debtor. Id. at 468. The court ultimately held that the financing 
statement was insufficient due to the creditor’s failure to sufficiently provide the name of the debtor 
and stated “[t]rade names may be added, but not as part of the organizational name itself.” Id. at 466. 
 94 U.C.C. § 9-506(c). A third-party creditor is not required to search the files before extending 
credit and taking a security interest in the debtor’s assets, but any prudent creditor would see if there 
are any existing liens on the debtor’s assets that would have priority over its claim should it extend 
credit. See id. § 9-322 (stating that the first party to file or perfect has priority over subsequent security 
interests). 
 95 See CLARK & CLARK, supra note 73, § 2.09 (stating the importance of doing due diligence and 
providing the exact debtor name); see also In re EDM Corp., 431 B.R. at 468 (finding that the inclu-
sion of the debtor’s trade name after the debtor’s correct name made the financing statement seriously 
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Occasionally, debtors change their name; in that case, any financing 
statement filed under their name might be rendered seriously misleading.96 
Under these circumstances, “the financing statement is effective to perfect a 
security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor before, or within four 
months after, the filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading.”97 
For collateral acquired more than four months after the name change, the fi-
nancing statement will not perfect this collateral.98 Therefore, an amendment 
to the financing statement must be filed within four months of the name 
change if the lender wants to remain continuously perfected as to all collateral 
and maintain its original priority date.99 
II. COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS OF ARTICLE 9 REGARDING COLLATERAL 
INDICATIONS BY REFERENCE AND DEBTOR NAMES 
The contrasting holdings of In re Financial Oversight and Management 
Board for Puerto Rico (In re Financial Oversight) and In re I80 Equipment, 
LLC created a circuit split between the First and Seventh Circuits on the issue 
of the sufficiency of a collateral indication by reference for purposes of a fi-
nancing statement.100 Further, In re Financial Oversight gives rise to a new 
question under section 9-503 of the UCC because the debtor is a government 
entity and the Puerto Rican legislature enacted laws that were inconsistent with 
respect to the name of the debtor.101 
This Part lays out the facts of each case and examines the courts’ reason-
ing for their respective holdings regarding the collateral description and the 
First Circuit’s reasoning regarding the debtor’s name.102 Section A provides the 
                                                                                                                           
misleading because a search using only the debtor’s correct name did not produce the filed financing 
statement); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors for Tyringham Holdings, Inc. v. Suna Bros. (In re 
Tyringham Holdings, Inc.), 354 B.R. 363, 368 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006) (holding that the omittance of 
“Inc.” in providing the debtor’s name in the financing statement enabled the financing statement to be 
seriously misleading because a search under the debtor’s correct name, which included “Inc.,” did not 
produce the financing statement). 
 96 See CLARK & CLARK, supra note 73, § 2.09 (describing the process of filing when a debtor 
changes its name). 
 97 U.C.C. § 9-507(c)(1). 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. 
 100 Compare Altair Glob. Credit Opportunities Fund (A), LLC v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for 
P.R. (In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.) (In re Financial Oversight), 914 F.3d 694, 143 (1st 
Cir. 2019) (determining that referencing property in a publicly available document did not provide 
notice to searchers and therefore did not perfect bondholders’ security interest), with First Midwest 
Bank v. Reinbold (In re I80 Equip., LLC), 938 F.3d 866, 870 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding that a financing 
statement’s collateral indication that referred to collateral described in the unattached security agree-
ment did provide adequate notice to searchers and did perfect the creditor’s security interest). 
 101 See In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 703 (attesting to the unique circumstances that 
created an ambiguity in the debtor’s name). 
 102 See infra notes 108–186 and accompanying text. 
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facts of In re Financial Oversight.103 Section B provides the facts of In re I80 
Equipment, LLC.104 Section C details the First Circuit’s affirmance of the Dis-
trict Court of Puerto Rico’s decision that the collateral indications were insuf-
ficient.105 Section D summarizes the Seventh Circuit’s holding that the collat-
eral indication at issue was sufficient.106 Section E explores the First Circuit’s 
holding that the amendments provided a valid debtor name.107 
A. Background of In re Financial Oversight 
The issues relating to collateral descriptions and debtor names in financing 
statements came to the forefront in In re Financial Oversight.108 In 1951, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico’s legislature enacted the Enabling Act, which 
created and authorized the Employees Retirement System of the Government of 
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (ERS) to issue debt and secure its debt with 
its own assets.109 On January 24, 2008, the ERS issued pension funding bonds in 
accordance with a Pension Funding Bond Resolution (Resolution).110 The Reso-
lution is publicly available, both electronically and in hard copy.111 The holders 
of the ERS bonds (Bondholders) that were issued in furtherance of the Resolu-
tion were granted a security interest in collateral termed “Pledged Property.”112 
“Pledged Property” was defined in detail in the Resolution.113 
                                                                                                                           
 103 See infra notes 108–134 and accompanying text. 
 104 See infra notes 135–140 and accompanying text. 
 105 See infra notes 141–159 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 160–166 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 167–186 and accompanying text. 
 108 See infra notes 109–134 and accompanying text (laying out the facts of In re Financial Over-
sight and Management Board for Puerto Rico). 
 109 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, §§ 761–788 (2011); Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Altair 
Glob. Credit Opportunities Fund (A), LLC (In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.) (In re Finan-
cial Oversight (P.R.)), 590 B.R. 577, 583 (D.P.R. 2018). The ERS fulfills the purpose of dispensing 
pension payments to retired employees of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, various public corpora-
tions in the Commonwealth, and selected municipalities. In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 
583. 
 110 In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 583. Approximately $2.9 billion in bonds were 
issued pursuant to the Resolution. Brief for Appellee the Financial Oversight and Management Board 
for Puerto Rico, as Representative for the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico at 7, In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d 694 (No. 18-1836) [hereinaf-
ter Appellee’s Brief]. 
 111 In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 584. The Resolution can be found in hard copy at 
the offices of ERS and on the websites of the Government Development Bank, the ERS, and the Elec-
tronic Municipal Market Access System. Id. 
 112 Id. The majority of the Bondholders include individual Puerto Rican citizens and local Puerto 
Rican businesses. Appellants’ Opening Brief at 4, In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d 694 (No. 18-
1836) [hereinafter Appellants’ Brief]. 
 113 In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 584. The Resolution defined “Pledged Property” 
to include the following: all revenues, funds, accounts, subaccounts, cash and non-cash proceeds, 
rights to personal property pledged by the ERS, and more. Id. It further defined “revenues” to include 
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The Bondholders and ERS executed a security agreement (Security 
Agreement) on June 2, 2008.114 The Security Agreement granted the Bond-
holders “a security interest in (i) the Pledged Property, and (ii) all proceeds 
thereof and all after-acquired property, subject to application as permitted by 
the Resolution.”115 The definition of “Pledged Property” was not included in 
the Security Agreement, but the Security Agreement stated that “[a]ll capital-
ized words not defined herein shall have the meanings ascribed to them in the 
Resolution.”116 
 Two initial financing statements were filed with the Puerto Rico Depart-
ment of State about a month after Bondholders and the ERS executed the Se-
curity Agreement.117 Each financing statement identifies the debtor as “Em-
ployees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puer-
to Rico.”118 In the collateral indication field, each financing statement de-
scribed the collateral as “[t]he pledged property described in the Security 
Agreement attached as Exhibit A hereto and by this reference made a part 
hereof.”119 The Security Agreement was attached to each financing statement, 
but the Resolution that defined the collateral, the “Pledged Property,” was not 
included in either of the filings.120 
In 2013, the Puerto Rican legislature passed Act 3-2013, which amended 
the original Enabling Act that established the ERS.121 Among various changes, 
it amended section 1-101 of the Enabling Act, causing a potential name change 
of the ERS to the “Retirement System for Employees of the Government of the 
                                                                                                                           
all employers’ contributions, proceeds from bonds, income and interest realized by any fund or ac-
count, and more. Id. 
 114 Id. at 585. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. The Security Agreement provided that the ERS make the UCC filings and that the secured 
party not be responsible for any of them. Appellants’ Brief, supra note 112, at 6. Thus, ERS filed the 
two initial financing statements. Id. This is an uncommon arrangement, as creditors should never rely 
on debtors to make a filing that comports with the rules of the Code. Dan Schechter, Although Origi-
nal Financing Statements Failed to Describe Collateral, $2.9 Billion Bond Issuance Was Properly 
Secured Because Amendments to Financing Statements Later Cured the Defects. [In re Financial 
Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico, 2019 WL 364029 (1st Cir. 2019).], COM. FIN. 
NEWSL., Feb. 4, 2019 (describing the dangers of relying on debtors for filings and recommending that 
creditors should at least carefully review the forms that the debtor prepares to file on behalf of the 
creditor). 
 118 In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 585. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id. In sum, the Resolution included the definition of “Pledged Property,” but it was not at-
tached to the Security Agreement, which omitted the definition of “Pledged Property.” Appellee’s 
Brief, supra note 110, at 8. 
 121 2013 P.R. LAWS 39; In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 585. The Enabling Act was 
first approved in Spanish on April 4, 2013 and translated and published into English on February 28, 
2014. In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 706. 
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Commonwealth of Puerto Rico” (RSE).122 Both the old name and the new 
name, ERS and RSE, are used throughout Act No. 3-2013.123 Further, both 
names are used throughout the amended Enabling Act to designate the name of 
the retirement and benefit system.124 
The Department of State received a total of four UCC-3 amendment 
forms filed by the Bondholders in December 2015 and January 2016.125 In 
each amendment form a new collateral indication reads as follows: “[t]he 
Pledged Property and all proceeds thereof and all after-acquired Property as 
described more fully in Exhibit A hereto and incorporated by reference.”126 
None of the UCC-3s included a debtor name and only referred to the debtor as 
“ERS” in Exhibit A attached to each of the UCC-3s.127 
On June 30, 2016, the United States enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight, 
Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) into federal law.128 
The law established the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto 
Rico; it had the task of restructuring the government of Puerto Rico’s debt, 
which rose to over $70 billion.129 Section 405 of PROMESA put in place an 
automatic stay that prohibited creditors from obtaining or enforcing any securi-
ty interest against the Puerto Rican government.130 The Bondholders filed a 
motion in the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico on September 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See Appellee’s Brief, supra note 110, at 39 (detailing the potential name change). The text that 
amended the English language Enabling Act reads: “A retirement and benefit system to be designated 
as the ‘Retirement System for Employees of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,’ 
which shall be considered a trust, is hereby created.” P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 761. The original Span-
ish language Enabling Act and amended Spanish language Enabling Act consistently designated the 
debtor’s name as the following: “Sistema de Retiro de los Empleados del Gobierno del Estado Libre 
Asociado de Puerto Rico.” Id. 
 123 2013 P.R. LAWS 39. 
 124 P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, §§ 761–788. Compare id. § 761 (stating “[a] retirement and benefit 
system to be designated as the ‘Retirement System for Employees of the Government of the Com-
monwealth of Puerto Rico,’ which shall be considered a trust, is hereby created”), with id. § 763(36) 
(defining “System” to “mean the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico”). 
 125 In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 585. 
 126 Id. Exhibit A is attached to each of the UCC-3s and includes definitions for terms such as 
“Revenues” and “Employers’ Contributions,” terms found in the publicly available Resolution that the 
initial financing statements refer to. Id. at 586. 
 127 Id. 
 128 Nick Brown, Puerto Rico Authorizes Debt Payment Suspension; Obama Signs Rescue Bill, REU-
TERS (Jun. 30, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-puertorico-debt/puerto-rico-authorizes-debt-
payment-suspension-obama-signs-rescue-bill-idUSKCN0ZG09Y [https://perma.cc/5QNA-RBZZ]. See 
generally Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, 48 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2241 
(2018). 
 129 48 U.S.C. § 2121(b)(1); see Brown, supra note 128 (describing that the Puerto Rico Oversight, 
Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA) allows Puerto Rico to undergo a “bankruptcy-
like debt restructuring process”). PROMESA states that its purpose is to achieve “fiscal responsibility 
and access to the capital markets.” 48 U.S.C. § 2121(a). 
 130 48 U.S.C. § 2194. 
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21, 2016, to lift the automatic stay in Altair Global Credit Opportunities Fund 
(A), LLC v. Garcia-Padilla.131 The ERS, among other parties, entered into a stip-
ulation to resolve the dispute.132 This stipulation mandated that the ERS deposit 
all contributions received during the section 405 automatic stay into a separate, 
segregated account.133 Soon after, the ERS filed suit against the Bondholders 
asserting that the Bondholders failed to perfect its security interest.134 
B. Background of In re I80 Equipment, LLC 
I80 Equipment, LLC was a business in Illinois that received a loan from 
First Midwest Bank to fund its purchase and refurbishment of trucks for re-
sale.135 The parties executed a security agreement that granted First Midwest 
Bank a security interest in nearly all of I80 Equipment, LLC’s assets.136 Twen-
ty-six asset categories were described, including “accounts, cash, equipment, 
instruments, goods, inventory, and all proceeds of any assets.”137 Subsequently, 
First Midwest Bank filed a financing statement to perfect its security inter-
est.138 The financing statement indicated the collateral by stating the following: 
“All Collateral described in First Amended and Restated Security Agreement 
dated March 9, 2015 between Debtor and Secured Party.”139 Two years later, 
I80 Equipment, LLC filed for bankruptcy and its trustee argued First Midwest 
Bank did not properly perfect its security interest because its collateral indica-
tion was insufficient.140 
                                                                                                                           
 131 Altair Glob. Credit Opportunities Fund (A), LLC v. United States, 138 Fed. Cl. 742, 766 
(2018). The Bondholders filed their motion to lift the automatic stay because they argued that the ERS 
and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico failed to provide adequate protection to their property interests 
and “the value of their liens would inevitably decline as a result of the actions by ERS and the Com-
monwealth.” Id. at 766–67. 
 132 In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 586. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. at 587. In addition to claims regarding the Bondholders’ security interest, the suit brought 
by the ERS through the Financial Oversight and Management Board sought declarations regarding the 
Bondholders’ compliance with the stipulation. In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 708. The Bond-
holders’ brought nine counterclaims regarding their security interests and claimed the ERS violated 
the stipulation. Id. 
 135 In re I80 Equip., LLC, 938 F.3d at 869. 
 136 Id. 
 137 Id. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. 
 140 Id. 
2248 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:2229 
C. The First Circuit’s and District Court of Puerto Rico’s Decision  
That the Collateral Indications Were Insufficient 
Article 9’s filing system warns third parties that the secured lender on file 
may have a security interest in the collateral described.141 The collateral de-
scription serves as a “starting point for investigation” when searchers are con-
sidering whether to lend to a particular debtor.142 In In re Financial Oversight, 
the Bondholders contended that the collateral indication’s cross-reference to an 
attached security agreement—which in turn cross-referenced a publicly availa-
ble document not in the filings—satisfied this notice requirement.143 
The Bondholders pointed to Chase Bank of Florida, N.A. v. Muscarella for 
support.144 The collateral indication in that case referenced collateral defined in 
an attached exhibit and the exhibit referenced an unattached document that 
properly defined the collateral.145 The court held that the collateral indication 
was sufficient because a searcher could ascertain that the collateral was the debt-
or’s share in a partnership.146 The court quoted the Official Comments to the 
Code at then section 9-402 (currently section 9-502) and noted, “[f]urther in-
quiry from the parties concerned [was] necessary to disclose the complete state 
of affairs.”147 The Bondholders argued that its collateral indication is similar 
and should be deemed sufficient because it provided an adequate starting point 
for searchers, as they could find the true nature of the collateral by looking up 
the publicly available Resolution.148 In contrast, a searcher could not know the 
collateral was anything more than an assignment of a partnership interest in 
Muscarella because the agreement laying out the partnership interest was not 
attached nor publicly available.149 The District Court of Puerto Rico found this 
                                                                                                                           
 141 See In re Cushman Bakery, 526 F.2d 23, 28 (1st Cir. 1975) (articulating the function of Article 
9’s notice system); U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 2. 
 142 Appellants’ Brief, supra note 112, at 22 (quoting John Deere Co. of Balt. v. William C. Pahl 
Constr. Co., 34 A.D.2d 85, 88 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970)). 
 143 See id. at 24 (arguing that the reference to an external, publicly available document satisfies 
the UCC’s collateral description requirement). 
 144 Id. (citing Chase Bank of Fla., N.A. v. Muscarella, 582 So. 2d 1196, 1197 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991)). 
 145 Chase Bank, 582 So. 2d at 1197. The exhibit stated: “[a]ll of the Debtor’s right, title and inter-
est, in the ‘Collateral’ as more particularly defined and described in that certain Assignment of Part-
nership Interest and Security Agreement dated January 20, 1987, up to an amount not to exceed 
$600,000.” Id. 
 146 See id. at 1198 (holding that searchers were on notice that a partnership interest was the collat-
eral). 
 147 Id. (quoting U.C.C. § 9-402 cmt. 2) (currently residing at § 9-502 cmt. 2). 
 148 See Appellants’ Brief, supra note 112, at 23 (noting that courts have upheld collateral descrip-
tions that require use of external evidence as sufficient). 
 149 See id. at 24–25 (describing the court’s reasoning in Muscarella to only require the financing 
statement to be the starting point of inquiry). 
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argument unpersuasive, stating that the collateral indication “requires a level of 
specificity sufficient to delineate the outer boundaries of the collateral.”150 
The Bondholders further contended that because the Resolution was a 
publicly available document, the description was adequate.151 The District 
Court noted that although some courts have held that collateral indications that 
reference publicly available documents are sufficient, those documents were 
publicly available in the sense that they were in UCC filings, not outside of the 
filing office.152 Article 9’s notice function, the court noted, would be defeated 
if searchers had to go outside the UCC records to ascertain an indication of the 
collateral.153 Therefore, an indication reading “Pledged Property” is inadequate 
because it fails to include a “definition or explanation of the term’s scope or 
meaning” in the filings.154 
In affirming the District Court’s collateral indication holding, the First 
Circuit noted that the filing system’s purpose is to provide notice to other cred-
itors.155 The court focused on the problems with the filings, stating that the col-
lateral indication did not describe collateral in any way, did not tell searchers 
where to find the publicly available Resolution, and that the Resolution could 
not be found at the UCC filing office.156 The court noted multiple concerns it 
had with searchers going outside of the UCC files to determine the collateral in 
a publicly available document.157 This included concerns about whether the 
collateral indicated in this document is the most recent version, whether the 
document includes the full list of the collateral, and whether the document is 
authentic.158 This finding contributed to the court’s determination that the col-
lateral indication did not provide adequate notice, thus rendering the initial 
financing statements insufficient.159 
D. The Seventh Circuit’s Decision that the Collateral  
Indications Were Sufficient 
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by noting a common canon of stat-
utory interpretation: statutes should be given their plain and ordinary meaning 
                                                                                                                           
 150 In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 589. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id.; see In re Tebbs Constr. Co., 39 B.R. 742, 747–48 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (holding that a 
collateral description that referenced a security agreement attached to a previous filing was an ade-
quate collateral description). 
 153 See In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 589 (expressing concerns about having 
searchers go outside of the filing office to find the collateral potentially subject to a security interest). 
 154 Id. at 590. 
 155 See In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 711 (describing the goals of the filing system). 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. at 711 n.12. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 712. 
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when the language is clear and unambiguous.160 It used this method to interpret 
Illinois’ section 9-502.161 In doing so, it found that the statute’s use of “indi-
cate” need not provide any sort of lead to what collateral is possibly subject to 
a lien; rather, “indicate” requires “a ‘signal’ that ‘point[s] out’ or ‘direct[s] at-
tention to’ an underlying security interest.”162 
The court next noted that incorporation by reference is a permissible 
method to describe collateral under section 9-108.163 This construction, along 
with the court’s approach to “indicating” the collateral, enabled the court to 
find that the indication was sufficient.164 The financing statement references 
the underlying security agreement, which in turn lists twenty-six categories of 
collateral.165 According to the court, this was a sufficient indication of collat-
eral as searchers were on notice that a lien may exist, and they knew where to 
look if they wanted to find the exact collateral that may be subject to a lien.166 
E. The First Circuit’s Holding That the Amendments  
Provide the Name of the Debtor 
Although the initial financing statements failed to perfect the Bondholders’ 
security interest, the amendments filed in 2015 and 2016 could have fixed the 
defective collateral indications in the initial financing statements or independent-
ly perfected the Bondholders’ security interest.167 After affirming the District 
                                                                                                                           
 160 In re I80 Equip., LLC, 938 F.3d at 870. 
 161 See 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-502 (West 2020) (stating that one of the requirements for 
a sufficient financing statement is that it “indicate[] the collateral covered by the financing state-
ment”); see also U.C.C. § 9-502(a)(3)). 
 162 In re I80 Equip., LLC, 938 F.3d at 871 (first quoting Indicate, WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COL-
LEGE DICTIONARY (4th ed. 2001); then quoting Indicate, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF 
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 2000); and then quoting Indicate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLE-
GIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2003)). 
 163 Id. at 874. Recall that one way to indicate collateral on a financing statement is to comply with 
the requirements of section 9-108. U.C.C. § 9-504(a)(1). 
 164 In re I80 Equip., LLC, 938 F.3d at 874. The security agreement, as the court explains, states 
twenty-six collateral types subject to the security agreement. Id. 
 165 Id. 
 166 See id. (further noting that, as a result, the trustee is unable to avoid First Midwest Bank’s lien 
in I80 Equipment, LLC’s bankruptcy proceedings under section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code). 
 167 In re Financial Oversight (P.R.), 590 B.R. at 590. The court noted two cases that lend weight 
to the Bondholders’ argument. Id. In Miami Valley Production Credit Ass’n v. Kimley, the Court of 
Appeals of Ohio held that two initial defective financing statements, which on their own were defec-
tive, but together satisfied the financing statement requirements, could be read together to produce a 
sufficient financing statement that perfects the lender’s security interest. 536 N.E.2d 1182, 1183 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1987). This financing statement would be deemed effective as of the date of the filing of the 
second defective initial financing statement. Id. In In re G.G. Moss Co., the creditor filed an initial 
financing statement in the wrong office. Maremont Mktg., Inc. v. Marshall (In re G.G. Moss Co.), No. 
79-01585, 1981 WL 137971, at *778 (Bankr. E.D. Va. July 20, 1981). Three years later, the creditor 
filed an amendment in the correct office. Id. The Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
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Court’s decision regarding the collateral indications in the initial financing 
statements, the First Circuit found that the amendments used the appropriate 
name.168 The court first looked at the statutory language requiring that the debt-
or’s name be provided when the debtor is a registered organization and the lan-
guage in the amended Enabling Act.169 The appropriate focus when inquiring 
into a debtor’s name should be on the entire “public organic record . . . which 
purports to state, amend, or restate the registered organization’s name.”170 The 
court noted that, although section 1-101 of the amended Enabling Act designates 
the name of the retirement system as RSE, there is other language in the amend-
ed Act that refers to the retirement system as ERS.171 Therefore, section 1-101 of 
the amended Enabling Act is not the only clause in the Act that one must look at 
when determining the retirement system’s name.172 
The court addressed the retirement system’s argument that section 1-101 
of the amended Enabling Act controls the name of the debtor because of the 
“to be designated” clause.173 While RSE is used in the amended Enabling Act 
three times, ERS is used more than thirty-five times.174 In view of this evi-
                                                                                                                           
determined that the amendment perfected the creditor’s security interest because it contained the re-
quired information for a valid initial financing statement. Id. at *779. 
 168 See In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 719 (concluding that the initial financing statements 
and amendments, taken together, perfect the Bondholders’ security interest). Before engaging in its 
analysis regarding the debtor’s name on the amendments, the First Circuit held that the collateral 
description on the amendments met the requirements for a sufficient collateral description. Id. at 714. 
The amendments, which referenced an attached exhibit for its collateral description, contained a de-
tailed definition of “Pledged Property” which the court held as sufficient under the Code. Id. 
 169 Id. at 716. The two clauses are section 9-503(a)(1) of the UCC and section 761 of the amended 
Enabling Act. Id.; see also P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 761; U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1). Section 9-503(a)(1) 
requires the financing statement to provide the “name on the public organic record . . . enacted by the 
registered organization’s jurisdiction of organization which purports to state, amend, or restate the 
registered organization’s name.” U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1). Section 761 of the amended Enabling Act 
provides “[a] retirement and benefit system to be designated as the ‘Retirement System for Employees 
of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,’ which shall be considered a trust, is hereby 
created.” P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 761. 
 170 In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 716 (quoting U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1)). 
 171 See id. (reconciling the amended Enabling Act with the Code’s requirements of providing the 
name of the debtor if the debtor is a registered organization). 
 172 Id. at 716–17. 
 173 Id. at 717 (countering the retirement system’s argument). See generally P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, 
§ 761. 
 174 In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 717. The court stressed the usage of the ERS name in 
the amended Enabling Act’s definition of the term “system.” Id. The definition section states the fol-
lowing: “System. Shall mean the Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico.” P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 763(36). Further, although section 1-101 designates 
the name of the debtor as RSE, the section’s header uses the name ERS. Id. § 761. The ERS name is 
also included in other section headings throughout the amended Enabling Act. See id. §§ 761a, 762, 
763, 764, 765, 765a, 766, 766a, 766b, 766c, 766d, 768, 768a, 769, 769a, 770, 770a, 771, 772, 773, 
774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 779a, 779b, 779c, 781a, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 786a, 786b, 787, 788. 
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dence, the court found no reason to disregard the ERS name and found no ra-
tionale explaining why the RSE name is used instead.175 
The court next highlighted the Puerto Rican legislature’s intent behind 
amending the Enabling Act; specifically, that it did not find evidence of an in-
tentional name change from ERS to RSE.176 In its Statement of Motives for 
amending the Enabling Act in 2013, the legislature identified “the fiscal crisis 
in Puerto Rico, the causes of the crisis, and the need to act promptly.”177 The 
court also reasoned that in amendments prior to the 2013 amendments, the leg-
islature changed the name of the retirement system, such as in 2004, demonstrat-
ing that the legislature is capable of properly changing the name when it wishes 
to.178 In addition, the Spanish language version of the 2013 amended Enabling 
Act uses the same name to designate the retirement system as the pre-2013 Ena-
bling Act.179 Based on these facts, the court concluded that the legislature did 
not intend to change the name of the retirement system from ERS to RSE.180 
The court also found noteworthy that the retirement system referred to it-
self as ERS in its court filings both before and after the Enabling Act was 
amended and never referred to itself as RSE.181 Moreover, the name of the re-
tirement system was ERS for over sixty years, so any creditor searching the 
system to find liens prior to the purported name change would have to search 
under “ERS.”182 This also helped the court determine that, along with the var-
ied use of RSE and ERS in the amended Enabling Act, any prudent creditor 
would at least search under the ERS name.183 
All of these factors contributed to the holding that ERS was the valid 
name for UCC purposes after the Enabling Act was amended in 2013.184 As a 
                                                                                                                           
 175 In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 717. 
 176 Id. at 717–18. 
 177 Id. at 717. 
 178 Id. at 718. 
 179 Id. at 716 n.20. The court also called attention to a Puerto Rican law stating that when there is 
any discrepancy between the English and Spanish version of the same law, “the Spanish text shall be 
preferred to the English” when the legislature originally passed the law in Spanish. Id. at 717; see also 
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 13 (2011). The court reasoned that this rule implied that the legislature did 
not intend to change the name because the Spanish name of the retirement system remained the same 
in the pre-2013 Enabling Act and the amended Enabling Act. In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 
717. 
 180 In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 717. Years after the amended Enabling Act was prom-
ulgated, the official English translation of the Puerto Rico Financial Emergency and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 2017 referenced the retirement system as “the Employees Retirement System.” Id. at 718. 
The court mentioned that this is also evidence that the legislature did not intend to change the name 
from ERS to RSE. Id. 
 181 Id at 718. 
 182 Id. at 718–19. See generally U.C.C. § 9-507(c)(1). When a debtor changes its name, “the fi-
nancing statement is effective to perfect a security interest in collateral acquired by the debtor before, 
or within four months after, the filed financing statement becomes seriously misleading.” Id. 
 183 In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 719. 
 184 Id. 
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result, the court concluded that the 2015 and 2016 amendments to the initial 
financing statements perfected the Bondholders’ security interest.185 According 
to the court, the amendments “contained an appropriate name of the debtor 
under the Commonwealth’s Article 9.”186 
III. INSUFFICIENT COLLATERAL INDICATIONS AND WHAT TO  
DO WHEN THE DEBTOR IS A GOVERNMENT ENTITY 
The facts of In re Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto 
Rico (In re Financial Oversight) raise a novel issue surrounding the Code’s 
Article 9.187 Never before has a court had to interpret a statute that creates an 
ambiguity as to the name of a debtor that is a government entity.188 Further-
more, In re Financial Oversight and In re I80 Equipment, LLC articulate two 
different conclusions about the sufficiency of a financing statement’s collateral 
indication that references a security agreement.189 This Part discusses how ref-
erences to publicly available documents in collateral descriptions should be 
treated and how statutes that designate an entity’s name should be read.190 Sec-
tion A argues that collateral indications in financing statements that reference 
an external document are insufficient collateral indications.191 Section B argues 
that, in determining an entity’s name for purposes of a financing statement, the 
clause that designates the entity’s name should be the name of the entity, re-
gardless of other circumstances.192 Section C explores how future cases that 
present novel issues within the Article 9 framework should be analyzed.193 
A. Collateral Descriptions That Reference External (to the Filing Office) 
Documents for Collateral Indications, Without More, Are Insufficient 
The First Circuit is correct in its analysis regarding the collateral indica-
tion: a collateral indication that references an external document, without 
                                                                                                                           
 185 Id. 
 186 Id. Because the First Circuit concluded that the Bondholders had perfected their security inter-
est, their security interest could not be avoided in bankruptcy using section 544(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Id. 
 187 See Altair Glob. Credit Opportunities Fund (A), LLC v. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. 
(In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.) (In re Financial Oversight), 914 F.3d 694, 703 (1st Cir. 
2019) (attesting to the uniqueness of the issues presented). 
 188 See id. (noting the novelty of the issue). 
 189 Compare id. at 712 (holding that the collateral indications were insufficient because they did 
not provide the proper notice to subsequent creditor), with First Midwest Bank v. Reinbold (In re I80 
Equip., LLC), 938 F.3d 866, 874 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding that the collateral indication was sufficient). 
 190 See infra notes 194–244 and accompanying text. 
 191 See infra notes 194–211 and accompanying text. 
 192 See infra notes 212–227 and accompanying text. 
 193 See infra notes 228–244 and accompanying text. 
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more, is an insufficient collateral indication.194 Although the Bondholders are 
correct in asserting that the financing statement is the starting point of inquiry, 
a financing statement’s collateral indication must give some notice to third 
parties about what collateral may be subject to a security interest.195 This idea 
is consistent with the Code’s sufficient collateral indication requirement, where 
a creditor must either indicate that the financing statement covers all of the 
debtor’s assets or all personal property or describe the collateral pursuant to 
section 9-108.196 
If a creditor is permitted to lead a searcher to an external document in its 
indication of the collateral it is claiming a lien on, the searcher could encounter 
a variety of problems.197 The First Circuit appropriately posed various ques-
tions regarding the publicly available document, such as where the document 
could be found, how the searcher would know where to find the document, 
whether the public document that the description refers to is the latest version, 
whether it is authentic, and whether it includes a complete list of the covered 
collateral.198 These concerns advance the proposition that collateral indications 
that reference external documents to indicate the collateral, without anything 
else, are insufficient under Article 9.199 
The Seventh Circuit’s rationale undermines the value that collateral indi-
cation brings to the operation of the filing system.200 Its definition of “indicate” 
renders the purpose of indicating the collateral null.201 Section 9-502(a) states 
the requirement for a sufficient financing statement: it (1) provides the name of 
the debtor; (2) provides the name of the secured party or a representative of the 
                                                                                                                           
 194 See In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 711–12 (concluding that the financing statements’ 
collateral descriptions did not sufficiently indicate the collateral); Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for 
P.R. v. Altair Glob. Credit Opportunities Fund (A), LLC (In re Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R.), 
590 B.R. 577, 590 (D.P.R. 2018) (holding the collateral descriptions did not do anything more than 
indicate the existence of some collateral). 
 195 See U.C.C. § 9-502 cmt. 2 (stating that “[f]urther inquiry from the parties concerned will be 
necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs”). 
 196 Id. §§ 9-108, -504. Section 9-108 prescribes that a description reasonably identifies collateral 
if it identifies the collateral by specific listing, category, a type of UCC category of collateral, quanti-
ty, computational or allocational formula or procedure, or any other way that makes the identity of the 
collateral is objectively determinable. Id. § 9-108. 
 197 See In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 711 n.12 (listing the possible issues with requiring 
a searcher to look outside the files for a description of the collateral); Appellee’s Brief, supra note 
110, at 28 (raising questions regarding the sufficiency of describing the collateral in a publicly availa-
ble document outside the filing office). 
 198 In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 711 n.12. 
 199 See id. at 711 (describing that a searcher only has notice that there is some collateral subject to 
a security interest, not what collateral is subject to the security interest, when looking at the financing 
statement in the filing office when the financing statement refers to a publicly available document, not 
in the filing office, for its collateral description). 
 200 See In re I80 Equip., LLC, 938 F.3d at 874 (finding that the collateral indication was sufficient 
to perfect). 
 201 See id. (providing the court’s reasoning). 
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secured party, and (3) indicates the collateral covered by the financing state-
ment.202 The Seventh Circuit’s reliance on the sensible creditor inquiring fur-
ther into the collateral at issue and its reasoning that a financing statement that 
references an external-to-the-filing office security agreement for its collateral 
indication is sufficient means that a financing statement really does not need to 
indicate collateral at all.203 Despite the statutory indication requirement, a fi-
nancing statement that provides the name of the debtor and the secured party 
(or representative of the secured party) would likely satisfy the Seventh Circuit 
because a searcher is on notice that a lien may exist and knows it needs to in-
quire further.204 Essentially, the Seventh Circuit ignores not only the require-
ment, but also any purpose that indicating the collateral provides to the Article 
9 filing system.205 
So, what purpose does indicating the collateral further? Consider two of the 
Code’s underlying policies: (1) “to simplify . . . the law governing commercial 
transactions” and (2) “to permit the continued expansion of commercial practic-
es . . . .”206 With collateral indications that identify collateral that may be subject 
to the security agreement, creditors can see what they need to see to make a de-
cision about whether to extend credit.207 It allows for swift action and does not 
require a potentially timely inquiry just to find out what collateral may be subject 
to the lien.208 This furthers the policy stated above: creditors can search the filing 
office, see the collateral subject to the security agreement, and make business 
decisions.209 The Seventh Circuit’s analysis adds the extra step of inquiring into 
the existing lending relationship between the debtor and secured party.210 Article 
9 does not require this step—and financing statements ought to be construed to 
require notice of security agreement-encumbered collateral without requiring 
creditors to search outside the filing office.211 
B. Entities’ Names Must Not Be Unnecessarily Construed 
In In re Financial Oversight, the First Circuit inappropriately read the 
debtor’s name as ERS instead of RSE.212 In doing so, the court introduces an 
                                                                                                                           
 202 U.C.C. § 9-502(a). 
 203 See In re I80 Equip., LLC, 938 F.3d at 874. 
 204 U.C.C. § 9-502(a)(3); see In re I80 Equip., LLC, 938 F.3d at 874. 
 205 U.C.C. § 9-502(a)(3). 
 206 Id. § 1-103(a)(1)-(2). 
 207 Id. § 9-504. 
 208 Id. 
 209 Id. § 1-103(a)(1)-(2). 
 210 See In re I80 Equip., LLC, 938 F.3d at 874. 
 211 U.C.C. §§ 9-502(a)(3), -504. 
 212 See In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 714–19 (introducing a new reading to § 9-503 of 
the Code, counting the number of times the ERS and RSE names were used, reading into the intent of 
the legislature in amending the Enabling Act, looking at the history of the retirement system’s usage 
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impractical standard for searchers of the filing office to determine the name of 
the debtor when it is a government entity.213 Nowhere in the Code is there a 
requirement that searchers read legislative intent into a statute when determin-
ing the name of a debtor when the debtor is a government entity.214 Moreover, 
when a third-party creditor who is considering extending credit, reads a statute 
to determine the name of a government entity, it will likely not read past the 
clause that designates the name of the debtor because section 9-503 does not 
require them to do so.215 
Although the drafting error committed by the Puerto Rican legislature is 
rare and unlikely to occur again, courts have consistently held that in cases 
where the debtor’s name is wrong because of a minor error and the search un-
der the wrong name in the filing office does not disclose the financing state-
ment, the security interest is unperfected.216 The burden that the First Circuit 
                                                                                                                           
of the ERS name, and assuming what name a reasonable searcher would search under in a filing office 
search). 
 213 See id. at 719 (determining that a clause that designates the name of a debtor does not provide 
the name of the debtor for filing purposes). The First Circuit’s ruling is likely inapplicable to other 
types of debtors. See id. In the case of a debtor that is an individual, the individual’s driver’s license 
will only have one name and that is the name of the debtor for UCC purposes, making it is impossible 
for there to be an interpretive issue as to the debtor’s name. See U.C.C. § 9-503 (stating the rules for 
providing the name of the debtor when the debtor is an individual). For other types of debtors, such as 
a decedent’s estate, trust or trustee, or general partnership, it is hard to imagine a scenario where a 
decedent can be interpreted to have had more than one name or the document or documents establish-
ing the debtor create a scenario where there may be more than one name of the debtor. See id. (laying 
out the rules for providing the name of the debtor when the debtor is a decedent’s estate, trust or trus-
tee, and general partnership). 
 214 Compare U.C.C. § 9-503 n.2 (noting the importance of providing the correct name of the 
debtor because it is the name that filing offices index under and is the name other potential creditors 
will search under), with In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d 719 (holding that a searcher would at 
least search under the long-standing name of the debtor and not necessarily the name that is designat-
ed in the amended statute that created the debtor). 
 215 See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 3, § 761 (2011) (stating that, “[a] retirement and benefit system to be 
designated as the ‘Retirement System for Employees of the Government of the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico,’ which shall be considered a trust, is hereby created”). 
 216 See Hastings State Bank v. Stalnaker (In re EDM Corp.), 431 B.R. 459, 468 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 
2010) (ruling that the creditor’s security interest did not perfect because the debtor’s name was “EDM 
Corporation,” the financing statement provided the debtor’s name as “EDM CORPORATION D/B/A 
EDM EQUIPMENT,” and a search under this name did not disclose the creditor’s financing state-
ments); Rushton v. Standard Indus., Inc. (In re C.W. Mining Co.), 488 B.R. 715, 728 (D. Utah 2013) 
(holding that the creditor failed to provide the name of the debtor because the creditor provided the 
name “CW Mining Company” instead of “C.W. Mining Company” and stating that “Article 9 is un-
forgiving of even minimal errors”); Mainsource Bank v. Leaf Capital Funding, LLC (In re Nay), 563 
B.R. 535, 540 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2017) (determining that a lender’s security interest did not perfect 
because it listed the individual debtor’s name as “Ronald Mark Nay” instead of “Ronald Markt Nay,” 
the name on the individual debtor’s driver’s license); PTM Techs., Inc. v. Maxus Capital Grp., LLC 
(In re PTM Techs., Inc.), 452 B.R. 165, 170 (Bankr. M.D. N.C. 2011) (deciding that a creditor’s fi-
nancing statement did not provide the name of the debtor and was therefore insufficient because it 
provided the name of the debtor as “PTM Tecnologies, Inc.,” instead of “PTM Technologies, Inc.,” 
and a search using the filing office’s standard search logic under the incorrect name did not reveal the 
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places on searchers to search under more than one name is inconsistent with 
these decisions and is not supported by the Code.217 
In future cases, where the debtor is a government entity and the entity is 
established by statute, the clause that designates the name of the debtor in the 
statute should be the name of the debtor regardless of other circumstances.218 
The First Circuit remarkably reads section 9-503(a)(1) of the Code to allow an 
entire statute to designate the name of the debtor when a single clause in the 
statute does just that.219 Yet, the court ignores this designation and creates an 
unworkable standard for searchers to guess the name of the debtor.220 It is im-
practical to expect that a searcher will assume legislative intent, count the 
number of times names are used in the statute, consider the name the entity has 
been historically known as, or regard the name the entity refers to itself as.221 
                                                                                                                           
financing statements); Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors for Tyringham Holdings, Inc. v. Suna 
Bros. (In re Tyringham Holdings, Inc.), 354 B.R. 363, 368 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006) (holding that the 
creditor did not perfect its security interest because it listed the Virginia corporation-debtor’s name as 
“Tyringham Holdings” instead of “Tyringham Holdings, Inc.,” the name listed in the public records). 
 217 See U.C.C. § 9-506 n.2 (“Such a financing statement is ineffective even if the debtor is known 
in some contexts by the name provided on the financing statement and even if searchers know or have 
reason to know that the name provided on the financing statement refers to the debtor. Any suggestion 
to the contrary in a judicial opinion is incorrect.”); supra note 216 and accompanying text (laying out 
the relevant case law). 
 218 See Appellee’s Brief, supra note 110, at 46 (expressing that the designation clause in the stat-
ute could not be clearer in providing the name of the debtor). 
 219 See In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 719 (holding that the RSE name was a valid name 
for UCC purposes). The First Circuit’s holding also allows the possibility for a debtor to have more 
than one name because it held “that the ERS name was a correct name for the debtor for UCC purpos-
es.” Id. In In re Silver Dollar, LLC, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of 
Tennessee rejected a creditor’s argument that its debtor had two names. First Cmty. Bank of E. Tenn. 
v. Jones (In re Silver Dollar, LLC), 388 B.R. 317, 322 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008). The court read the 
language of section 9-503, notably “the name of the debtor indicated on the public record,” to mean 
only one name. Id.; see CLARK & CLARK, supra note 73, § 2.09 (addressing the court’s reasoning that 
a debtor can only have one name). 
 220 See In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 716 (determining that more than one clause, not 
just the clause that designates the name of the debtor, can state the name of the debtor for UCC pur-
poses). Section 9-503 of the Code states that if the debtor is a “registered organization” the lender 
must use “the name that is stated to be the registered organization’s name on the public organic record 
most recently filed with or issued or enacted by the registered organization’s jurisdiction of organiza-
tion which purports to state, amend, or restate the registered organization’s name.” U.C.C. § 9-
503(a)(1). 
 221 U.C.C. § 9-503(a)(1) (stating the rule for providing the name of a registered organization debt-
or). The First Circuit’s holding is based on concluding that a reasonable searcher would have made a 
search under the RSE name, but that is not the requirement of the Code. Id.; see In re Financial Over-
sight, 914 F.3d at 719 (concluding that a reasonable searcher would search under the name that is not 
in the clause that designates the name of the government entity). The requirement is simply whether 
the creditor provided the correct name and factors related to what a reasonable searcher would do 
should not be considered. See U.C.C. § 9-503 (omitting any considerations about what a reasonable 
searcher would do). 
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In further analyzing the First Circuit’s holding, it is helpful to consider 
the result had the debtor been a corporation instead of a government entity.222 
Under Delaware General Corporate Law Section 102(a)(1), a certificate of in-
corporation is required to set forth the name of the corporation.223 This often 
takes the form of a clause at the beginning of the certificate of incorporation 
that looks like the following: “The name of the corporation is Company X, 
Inc.”224 If the certificate of incorporation refers to the corporation as “Compa-
ny Y” in the remaining clauses, it would be difficult for a court to ignore the 
name designation clause that denotes the name of the corporation as “Compa-
ny X” because the actual name of the corporation is “Company X.”225 If the 
government entity in In re Financial Oversight was instead a Delaware corpo-
ration, no searcher would assume the incorporator’s intent, count the number 
of times “Company X” and “Company Y” were used in the certificate, consid-
er the name the corporation has been historically known as, or inquire into how 
the corporation refers to itself.226 Thus, the clause in the statute or certificate of 
incorporation that designates the name of the entity or corporation, respective-
ly, should always be the entity’s actual organizational name.227 
C. How to Interpret the Code? 
As discussed, In re Financial Oversight and In re I80 Equipment, LLC 
give rise to a contentious Article 9 issues; specifically, whether reference to 
external documents for a collateral indication is sufficient and what the name 
of a debtor is for purposes of a financing statement when the name of the debt-
or is ambiguous.228 In future cases involving these issues, courts should not 
interpret Article 9 like the Seventh Circuit did in In re I80 Equipment, LLC, 
with respect to the collateral indication issue, and like the First Circuit did in In 
re Financial Oversight, with respect to the debtor name issue.229 Instead, Arti-
cle 9 should be interpreted consistent with the Code’s purposes.230 Sometimes 
                                                                                                                           
 222 See In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 714 (likening a government entity to a registered 
organization under Article 9). 
 223 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(a)(1) (2020). 
 224 Id. 
 225 See id. (laying out the rule for stating the name of a corporation); see also U.C.C. § 9-
503(a)(1) (stating the rules for providing the name of a registered organization-debtor). 
 226 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 227 See In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 714 (likening a government entity to a registered 
organization under Article 9). 
 228 See In re I80 Equip., LLC, 938 F.3d at 869 (describing the collateral indication on the secured 
party’s financing statement); In re Financial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 703 (attesting to the odd circum-
stances and the novelty of the debtor name issue at play). 
 229 See infra notes 232–244 and accompanying text (arguing for a textualist approach when deal-
ing with new Article 9 issues). 
 230 See U.C.C. § 1-103 (listing the purposes of the UCC). Recall one of the Code’s purposes is “to 
simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions.” Id. 
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a broad interpretation will promote the Code’s policies and other times a strict 
interpretation will, but the choice of interpretation should be the one that best 
serves the Code’s policies.231 
When parties initiate a secured transaction, they do not attempt to follow 
the rules of Article 9 by making new and unforeseen interpretations of the Ar-
ticle’s provisions.232 Had the drafters of Article 9 wanted parties to consider a 
variety of factors other than the name designation clause—as the First Circuit 
did in its debtor name change holding in In re Financial Oversight—these fac-
tors would have been codified in Article 9.233 When parties entering into a se-
cured transaction face a novel issue, they rely on the text of the Code and are 
not in a position to engage in interpretive horseplay; courts should expect this 
approach and rule accordingly.234 When the First Circuit held that the Bond-
holders could have considered legislative intent, the number of times each of 
the names are used in the statute, the name that the debtor has been historically 
known as, and the name the debtor refers to itself as, it forced future secured 
lenders and searchers to consider new factors that Article 9 does not suggest.235 
This approach is unpredictable and can cause serious damage to parties under-
taking a secured transaction.236 Applying a strict interpretation, in this instance, 
to Article 9’s text allows parties to undergo common commercial transactions 
with certainty and without interpretive strain.237 
In the case of the collateral indication in In re I80 Equipment, LLC, the 
Seventh Circuit’s strict interpretation of the Code, specifically with respect to 
                                                                                                                           
 231 See id. (providing the Code’s purposes). 
 232 See NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 10 (noting that a transactional attorney’s role in a secured 
transaction is to follow the rules, minimize risks, and avoid litigation). 
 233 See U.C.C. § 9-503 (stating the rule for providing the name of the debtor on a financing state-
ment); supra notes 108–134 and accompanying text (detailing the facts of In re Financial Oversight 
and Management Board for Puerto Rico). 
 234 See NIMMER ET AL., supra note 2, at 10 (stating transactional attorneys attempt to reduce risk 
for their clients in a secured transaction). 
 235 See U.C.C. § 9-503 (setting forth the rule for providing the name of a debtor). 
 236 See Appellee’s Brief, supra note 110, at 45 (arguing that if § 9-503 were misconstrued, parties 
could not rely on official records and the risks to parties in a secured transaction would increase). 
 237 See U.C.C. § 1-103(a) (listing the purposes and policies of the Code, including “to simplify, 
clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions”). Critics of this approach may 
argue that section 1-103(a) says “[The Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally construed and 
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies.” Id. A strict interpretation of the Code, there-
fore, goes directly against the Code’s directions. See id. This, however, is misreading the Code, as a 
liberal interpretation of a Code provision that does not promote one of the Code’s policies is an im-
proper interpretation. See id. Thus, when the First Circuit read section 9-503(a)(1) and concluded that 
more than one clause can “state, amend, or restate the registered organization’s name,” it liberally 
construed the provision inconsistent with the Code’s purpose “to simplify, clarify, and modernize the 
law governing commercial transactions” and not consistent with any other purpose. See In re Finan-
cial Oversight, 914 F.3d at 716 (quoting P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 19, § 2323(a)(1) (2011)); U.C.C. §§ 1-
103(a), 9-503(a)(1) (stating the Code’s purposes and setting out the rule for providing the name of a 
registered organization-debtor). 
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the meaning of the word “indicate,” failed to promote the Code’s underlying 
policies.238 The Seventh Circuit construed the Code in such a way that search-
ers cannot rely at all on the filing system to find out what collateral may be 
encumbered by the security interest.239 This interpretation made the law gov-
erning commercial transactions more complex, not simpler, and this is against 
the Code’s policies.240 Furthermore, as one scholar noted, and per the Code’s 
policy, the Code “is not untethered to other states’ interpretation.”241 This is 
notable because, though it faced the same legal question, the Seventh Circuit 
did not even cite to the First Circuit’s In re Financial Oversight collateral indi-
cation decision or analysis.242 To reiterate, the Code seeks to encourage uni-
formity, and courts ought to note this policy, let alone acknowledge its sister 
courts’ interpretation, before interpreting the Code.243 Moving forward, in cas-
es presenting a novel issue arising under Article 9, courts should carefully con-
strue Article 9; whether a narrow or broad interpretation of the Code is pre-
ferred depends on which promotes the Code’s underlying policies.244 
CONCLUSION 
In re Financial Oversight and In re I80 Equipment, LLC give rise to vari-
ous issues that have widespread implications for transactional attorneys and 
others submitting financing statements to perfect security interests under Arti-
cle 9. A financing statement’s collateral indication that requires a searcher to 
go outside of the filing office’s files and seek out a publicly available docu-
ment should be deemed insufficient because it fails to give a sufficient indica-
tion of what collateral may be subject to a security interest. Otherwise, a host 
of concerns arises, including the authenticity of the public document, how re-
cent it is, and whether it is the complete document. With respect to the debtor’s 
name, the clause in the statute or certificate of incorporation that designates the 
name of the entity or corporation should always be the entity’s actual organiza-
tional name. Following these approaches creates a practical standard for 
searchers to follow when conducting searches and will confirm that they are on 
notice to any existing liens on the government entity’s assets. These approach-
es promote an essential policy underlying the Code: certainty. When faced with 
                                                                                                                           
 238 In re I80 Equip., LLC, 938 F.3d at 871–72. 
 239 Id. at 874. 
 240 U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(1). 
 241 Bruce A. Markell, The Road to Perdition: I80 Equipment, Woodbridge, and Liddle Pave the 
Way, 39 BANKR. L. LETTER, Nov. 2019; see U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(3) (stating one of the Code’s policies 
as “to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions”). 
 242 Markell, supra note 241. 
 243 U.C.C. § 1-103(a)(3). 
 244 Id. § 1-103. 
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novel questions about how to interpret the Code, courts should choose the in-
terpretation—whether broad or narrow—that best promotes its policies. 
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